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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
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3	DAOL REXMARK UNION STATION, LLC, et al,	
4	Plaintiffs,	
5	V •	22 Civ. 6649 (GHW)
7	UNION STATION SOLE MEMBER, LLC,	
8	Defendant.	
9	x	Conference
10		New York, N.Y. April 7, 2023 3:00 p.m.
11		3.00 p.m.
12	Before:	
13	HON. GREGO	RY H. WOODS,
14		District Judge
15	7 DDF 7	DANCES
	APPEARANCES	
16	MORRISON COHEN, LLP Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
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THE COURT: At the outset, I'd like to take the appearance from the parties. I'd like to begin with plaintiff. What I'd like to do is ask the principal spokesperson for each side of the case to identify him or herself and the members of their team rather than have each lawyer introduce themselves individually.

Let me start first with counsel for plaintiff. Who's on the line for plaintiffs.

MR. HONG: Good afternoon, your Honor. Richard Hong, H-O-N-G for the plaintiffs. With me are Amber Will, WILL and Mahnoor, M-A-H-O-N-O-O-R, last name M-I-S-B-A-H.

THE COURT: Thank you. Good. Thank you. So let me hear who's on the line for defendant.

MR. ROSS: Good afternoon, your Honor. David Ross from Kasowitz Benson for Union Station Sole Member, and with me is my colleague Andrew Breland.

about the rules I'd like the parties to follow during today's proceeding. At the outset, please remember that this is a public proceeding. Any member of the public or press is welcome to dial into this conference. I'm not presently monitoring who has dialed in, so I ask you all just to keep the possibility that third parties are auditing the call.

Second, please keep your phones on mute at all times

except when you're intentionally speaking to me or to the representatives of a party as a participant in the conference. Next, please state your name each time that you speak during the conference. I will not be doing that, but I ask that each of the other participants please state their name each time that they speak. Fourth, please abide by instructions by our court reporter that are designed to her help do her job. And finally I'm ordering that there be no recording or rebroadcast of all or any portion of today's conference.

Counsel, with that out of the way, let's turn to the substance of today's proceeding. I scheduled this conference in order to take up the issues raised in the letter submitted to me at Dkt No. 90. Let me hear from each of you about the issues presented. I should say I read the letter submitted by the parties. I have some questions about the nature of the issues that are presented to me for resolution here. We'll also need to talk about the extent to which the parties wish to submit briefing regarding these issues. And I'm going to expressly ask if that is indeed the request, it will change the focus of today's conference if this should be considered by the Court as really a premotion conference other than an opportunity to engage in a conversation geared toward resolution of the issues.

If that's the case, please feel free to let me know. I'm happy to refocus the conversation to the extent that this

is an issue that the parties wish to present formal briefing on. I will surely give you the opportunity to do that, and we'll focus much more heavily here on scheduling issues rather than a deeper conversation about the nature of the disputed issues, which we would take up in more depth after I've reviewed the briefing. So let me start, if I can, with counsel for defendant.

Counsel, first off, how should I conceive of the letter here? Is the request here that I grant leave to you to file a motion or more comprehensive briefing with respect to these issues? Again, I'm happy to do that, and I will focus on asking some targeted questions here that will hopefully inform the briefing, but we'll spend a little bit less time during the course of the conversation here today perhaps debating the substance of the questions presented. So counsel for defendants, let me ask that threshold question first and then we'll turn to a discussion of the nature of the disputed issues. Counsel.

MR. ROSS: Yes, David Ross once again for defendant. It was not our intention to have to fully brief the discovery issues that are presented by the letters that are now — the letter that is now before you unless your Honor feels after hearing the parties that full briefing would be necessary. We were hoping that by the end of this conference your Honor would issue a ruling, or at least guidance sufficient to resolve the

parties' dispute so that we don't have to formally brief it and either put the Court to the task of deciding the motion or the parties to the task of delaying the case. Part of the frustration that we have on the defense side is that we have a deadline coming up. We need the documents to take the depositions. Let me think. Let me see if I can just try to summarize beyond what's in the letter for the Court what I think is the nub of it.

Your Honor, we think that the issues that are presented on this application or in this letter submission are very straightforward and a kind of standard discovery 101 if you will that parties engage in all the time. What we had, is we served document requests. We got protests from the plaintiff that they were excessive in number or scope. Without waiving any rights or agreeing to give up anything, we made a good faith attempt repeatedly over numerous discussions to try to limit the requests in number and scope, and to reach agreement on ESI or electronic search terms that would assist in trying to identify responsive documents. At no point in time did we waive the right to actually seek the paper documents or the electronic documents that are called for by the requests.

Your Honor may recall that there came a time that the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. And in response to that, we filed a Rule 56(d) statement that laid out the reasons

why we could not fully respond, and the subject matters on which we would seek discovery before being able to respond fully and prepare the case for decision by summary judgment or trial. Your Honor agreed with us and denied the summary judgment motion. And in that decision your Honor said that the topics that we were seeking discovery on could give rise to a defense to the claims or otherwise undermine the claims of the plaintiff. And as a result, discovery should proceed.

So we have sought discovery. And as a result of the search protocols and the discussions we've had with plaintiffs' counsel, they performed searches that came up with a total of approximately 8,000 documents. Now for the proportionality issue, your Honor, remember that this case potentially involves hundreds of millions of dollars as to what is at stake. And what we think plaintiffs are seeking a windfall through the declaratory judgment that they're seeking. And they think they're simply seeking to enforce their rights whether it's a windfall or not. In any event, a large amount of money is involved. I don't think anybody disputes that.

Second, 8,000 documents is not extremely large, but after applying the search terms and plaintiffs ended up producing something like 400 documents to us. The production was not only paltry in number, but did not produce documents on a number of topics or failed to produce documents that we had from other sources, which we think would have been responsive

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to the search terms that we asked be searched. So we came back to them and said, we have four additional requests, or we're relying on four of the original — some of the original requests. And we would like to see all responsive documents that you have from those. However, we're not going to put you to the burden, as one would at the start of a case, of searching every file cabinet or every electronic source. We said you can use the 8,000 hits that you got as the total pool to search from to determine what documents you have about, for example, communications on Union Station and Cushman and Wakefield, very specifically defined names and terms.

And the other side has said, no. We're not doing That's beyond what we originally agreed to do in the way that. of search terms and a search protocol. And, your Honor, right before this phone call it occurred to us that it seems like such an obvious proposition that what one agrees to from the point of view of a search protocol is merely a tool to try to identify documents that may be responsive. But a party retains its obligation to conduct a reasonable search for responsive documents. And I thought it was so obvious, it took about ten seconds to find a decision in the Southern District of New York in a case called The Raine Group v. Reign Capital, LLC, a decision from Judge Katherine Parker, magistrate judge, from And, your Honor, I can give you -- everyone the Westlaw 2022. cite. It's 2022 WL 538336 at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. February 22, 2022).

And in that short decision Judge Parker says on this issue about ESI "In sum, an ESI protocol and search terms work in tandem with the parties' obligations under the federal rules and do not replace a parties' independent obligation to produce electronic or paper documents that are reasonably accessible, relevant, and responsive within the meaning of Rule 34."

Your Honor, on the four topics that we're seeking documents, they go directly, as I said, to the issues from the Rule 56(d) opposition. That they relate to, for example, the negotiation and drafting of the loan documents that are going to be the subject of further briefing to you and potentially trial. They go to the affirmative defenses that we asserted with respect to communications that were had with perspective tenants at Union Station, which may have been tortiously interfering with our clients rights or their ability to realize income with respect to the loans in question. Same thing with the Cushman and Wakefield item where we believe that Cushman and Wakefield was interposed by the plaintiffs to communicate with tenants, and we'll find out what documents among the 8,000 that are responsive.

And likewise documents that relate to communications with the equity lender and which relate too directly to our defense, that there were improprieties in interfering with our attempt to get equity infusion and be able to pay down the mezzanine loan, among other things. So in sum, we have

requests for relevant documents that are measured in number, that are reasonable in terms of the burden since we're agreeing that the plaintiffs don't have to go back and reinvent the wheel if you will and can use the 8,000 they have already -- I omitted to say that the plaintiff have told us that they already reviewed the entire group of 8,000. So they had been through them previously.

And, your Honor, we need the discovery in order to get on with the depositions and finish this case so it can be presented to you through future motions. That's it for now, your Honor. I'll reserve sometime to come back and reply if appropriate.

THE COURT: Thank you. Just briefly a couple of quick questions for you before I turn to counsel for plaintiff.

First, the plaintiffs argue in their letter that these four new topics are more expansive than the original written request.

So let me ask everybody to keep their phones on mute. Somebody just joined and they are not on mute. Thank you. So please keep yourselves on mute at all times if you would. Good.

Thank you very much.

So, first they argue that the scope of these requests is broader than the original request. They make a couple of arguments based on that. First is that it would require them to rerun the searches. I understand you would argue that that's not true because you're agreeing to a limit this process

to review of the 8,000 documents or so that were originally pulled, so I'll put that aside. The other principal difference between the written request and these requests is the word "concerning" which is of concern to them and potentially to the Court because they're arguably broader in scope than the underlying written request, and maybe more challenging, may make it more challenging to identify responsive documents than the request as previously formulated.

So can I ask you, counsel, to comment on whether the request that we've talking about today are broader than those that were contained in the original written request. And in particular, can you comment on the argument that the language of these new request which talk about documents that concern certain subjects or entities is substantially broader and more difficult therefore for them to identify the universal responsive documents. Go ahead counsel for defendant.

MR. ROSS: Yes, your Honor, David Ross. Number one, the previous — the requests are not more expansive than the original request that we served and that eventually led to discussions in an effort to see if we could narrow them and find common ground. But if the question is were the original requests — are these broader than the original requests, the answer is no.

As to your second question about the use of the word "concerning." Certain of the requests said, Give us your

communications with a certain party. And in some of these we are saying, concerning which. In other words, might be a discoverable document about a communication between plaintiff and Cushman and Wakefield. So to a certain extent, yes, your Honor, I think some of them could be said to be broader in terms of the use of the word "concerning." Though, frankly, every case I've ever worked on involving Rule 34 requests typically includes either the words "concerning" or "referring" or "relating to."

And those I don't think have ever been determined to be offensively overbroad in the ordinary context in which they are used. So in one case if I wrote to you, your Honor, that would be a communication with you. If I also had a document in which I said to Mr. Breland my colleague yesterday, I wrote to Judge Woods about the following matter -- and assuming it wasn't privileged -- that would also be responsive as it's certainly discoverable and could lead to discoverable information. It's also not overbroad in the sense of -- if the issue is, what were the communications about between you and me, Judge, in my hypothetical. So I don't think there's anything offensive, unusual or troubling about it, or that puts anybody through an extraordinary burden that they don't have in every other case.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you. Let me turn back to counsel for plaintiff. Counsel, what's your view.

MR. HONG: This is Richard Hong on behalf of the plaintiffs. I neglected to mention that for the plaintiff, we're from Morrison Cohen. I'm relatively new to the firm, so I think I should mention my firm. My apologies.

Making unreasonable discovery requests. Let me first address the two questions that you posed to Mr. Ross, and then I will get into a little more detail if you would allow me to sort of provide some context of why we are here and why the Court should not allow this discovery. To your questions about whether the new request are broader, it is most definitely broader. And then is it more expansive, that's an affirmative answer as well. It is more expansive. Despite whatever

Mr. Ross says, if you read the language of the new request and compare it, as we have done in our letter, it is crystal clear that they are asking for broader request.

Now, why is that important. Well, it's important because we're going to have to redo the document review, and we're going to re-spend time, and the burden is unreasonable to do that at this juncture. And I'm going to go into the burden issue because there is substantial burden issue. But before I do that, let me just briefly go over a couple of things that Mr. Ross did not mention.

Number one, we are here because your Honor advise us -- we're here in part because your Honor advised us on

December 1 that the parties should confer about the overbroad discovery request that the defense made. And what we did was taking your guidance, the parties met and they met and conferred. And from that process which is detailed in the letter, we came up with 100 search terms to search. We did expansive searches per defendant's request. They're not our search terms. We used their terms. And from that we got 8,000 documents.

Now those 8,000 documents arose because quite frankly some of the search terms were overbroad, so it picked up a lot of documents that it really shouldn't have picked up. But the reality is, those were the defendants search terms, so we used them.

And when we picked up 8,000, we now have to look for whether or not it was actually responsive to the document request that had been agreed upon. And from there, we called a smaller number, I think the number is close to 488 or 489 documents that we have pulled together and we sent them to the defense. Now clearly the defense is unhappy with those collections so they want a second bite at this juncture to ask for another production.

The problem is that we followed the defendant's request. We pulled the documents that were responsive, and we withheld the privileged documents. I don't know if any additional effort will quite frankly be meaningful. And in

this case I would like to remind the Court that Mr. Ross mentioned in prior conference that he was looking for limited discovery. And now it appears the broader terms that he's using, he's asked for more discovery that will clearly come against the discovery deadlines that we have and that it will pose more burden to the plaintiffs.

Now, I want to talk a little bit more about what the burdens are. We sort of figured out how much time and effort this will take for 8,000 documents. I wasn't sure how long it was going to take, your Honor. So I asked around, and we did some checking around and we did what we did in our prior production. It appears it would take about two weeks of associates working on this, and it will cost in excess over \$100,000 to do further review. This is not — contrary to what Mr. Ross said, this is not taking the 8,000 documents and then they're just looking it over again.

No, we have to look at the new broader request and to see if they're responsive to it or not. In other words, the associates who are familiar with this case, familiar with the issues need to look at each document again de novo. That is a substantial burden under the circumstances of this case, and it is not proportional to what is necessary.

Now we have tried, quite frankly, tried to work this out contrary to the position that Mr. Ross is taking. We have been trying to work with them to see whether or not there is a

possibility of doing something else. Quite frankly, they have taken the position that broader is better. And they can't agree to a broader is better when it's just not going to work. When we look at this issue, we agreed. One thing that I agree with Mr. Ross, it is a fundamental discovery dispute, but we see the world very differently. We see the world very differently because we made a lot of effort to make sure that we found and produced responsive documents. And on the other hand, they come back and ask us to do more on things that would likely not reveal much and would be a substantial burden on us.

Now I know that Mr. Ross mentioned about looking at all kinds of loan documents and things of that nature, and I understand about his affirmative defenses. But I do want to bring the Court back to what's really at issue from our perspective which is the mezzanine loan agreements. The specific provision of 5.2.2 provision on it, and that's really the operative issue that will ultimately be what will be briefed by the parties. So to us when the defendants are asking for all this overbroad discovery, it just seems — it really feels like a fishing expedition than not. So for all those reasons, we respectfully request that the defendants be denied of this additional unnecessary, unreasonable discovery.

THE COURT: Counsel, let me ask briefly about your estimates regarding the burden associated with these incremental request. First off, is that estimate based on

counsel for defendants premise namely that any search need only be conducted against the 8,000 odd documents that were originally pulled or does that estimate assume that a new search would need to be conducted?

MR. HONG: It's the former. We did not assume that we will do additional searches. We took defendant's premise, and I asked the associates how long it took, what time, what effort, since the associates were working on this case are familiar with this case, and it would be cost effected to have the associates do it again. And we estimated that — we take a certain number of hours, even at a very quick pace, and obviously their billing rates; and when we consider all these, essentially two weeks of work, it's well over \$100,000.

THE COURT: Thank you. Second related question goes to what the scope of the review would be you, which I assume would be connected in part to the scope of the prior review.

Does it make a difference in terms of the burden or how much of the difference does it make in terms of the burden associated with the requested incremental review if the new document request are limited to the scope of those request that were previously made; so if the request were limited to the original request as opposed to what you argued to be their more expansive supplemental request using the word "concerning."

Counsel for plaintiff, what's your thought?

MR. HONG: I'm not sure. I guess I'm not clear on

exactly what the defense would want us to do if we are using the old terms and old not the broader language on it. We have as we mentioned approximately 8,000 documents that were pulled, but I don't know exactly what they want us to do with those things that have been already reviewed on that. In either event, your Honor, in all candor, I think that we're going to have to review it again even with the limited scope. Now it may take a little less time perhaps, but it's still going to take a substantial amount of effort. I think there's -- I understand this is a large case. I understand that, but there's got to be sensibly patience here particularly when the defense agreed at the outset in December that it was going to be limited discovery.

THE COURT: Thank you. Understood. Another question that goes to burden. One of the supplemental areas of inquiry that the defendants are the seeking is something that I'd call analogous to their request five which is documents and communications concerning the drafting and negotiation of the loan document. I understand your contention is that the only loan documents that are at issue in this litigation are the loan documents consisting of the mezzanine loan documents. What's the incremental burden associated with this request were it to be limited to -- I'm going to begin with by asking the mezzanine loan documents.

MR. HONG: One moment, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Thank you.

(Pause)

MR. HONG: Based on what I'm advised, I think there's really not that much a difference because we only produced documents relating to the drafting history of Section 5.2.2. So the burden for us would be expanded if we were to look at the entire loan agreement. I appreciate, your Honor, that you may be looking at potential ways of limiting the burden. But given where we are, I'm not sure there's a way to limit the burden on us.

THE COURT: Thank you. Understood. I'll move on taking that not as an invitation to decide this as an all or nothing decision. Let me turn to counsel for defendant on this. I understand there's a production with respect to the loan documents according to counsel for plaintiff to date has been limited to information regarding the negotiation of Section 5.2.2. Of course my understanding is that any discovery related to the negotiation of the documents would be germane to this litigation only to the extent that the Court might ultimately find some provision of the loan agreements to be ambiguous, some portion that I have not had the opportunity to consider.

First let me just check that premise. And then second, I'm going to ask, are there other provisions of the loan documents, counsel, that you expect to argue are

ambiguous.

MR. ROSS: Your Honor, David Ross. I think -- let me see if I can answer it this way, and let me know if you need more. First of all, the production related to Section 5.2.2 was something like three pages. It was extremely limited, although the lawyers that drafted the documents and delivered 1200 documents or something on that order to plaintiff, their clients, which they said were responsive to the subpoena that we served on them. We have gotten just three pages or three emails, something tiny, number one.

Number two, in addition to Section 5.2.2 of the loan agreement, plaintiff themselves identified sections eight, nine and thirteen of the pledge agreement in their pleading, in their complaint, and Section 10.4 of the loan agreement in their claims. In addition to that, there are questions as to what the source of the provisions were in the loan agreement and who drafted them and whether they came from the mortgage loan documents and were copied into the mezzanine loan documents or not. So the reason why we're seeking this discovery — and again, we're talking about this limited universe of documents — it is because the question about where the provisions came from, and also because there are questions of construction. I mean, the plaintiffs have argued that your Honor has to look at the entire document in order to determine the context of the provisions, not just 5.2.2, but other parts

of the document including the remedy sections.

So we think we're entitled to discovery on issues that plaintiff has put in issue, number one. With respect to -- I have comments that I'd like to make briefly, your Honor, about this burden amount and how much it will cost. I want to first answer your question directly, so I'm going to stop at this point on that subject.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you very much. Very good, counsel. I'll turn back to you and give you the opportunity to respond to the other arguments that have been made. Very good. So let me turn back to you counsel for defendant before I turn to my next question, if there is anything you'd like to say in response to counsel for plaintiff, either arguments, let me give you the opportunity to do that so we don't miss that opportunity. Go ahead.

MR. ROSS: First of all, your Honor, on how much it's going to cost. Obviously that is something that's entirely within their control within reason. And they're telling you that they're going to have to spend 250 or 400 hours of lawyer time to review documents that they already reviewed to find the ones on these limited subjects. I'm a skeptic. I must say. I'm not saying Mr. Hong is misrepresenting anything, but I'm a skeptic, and I think the Court should be skeptical about how big a burden is being claimed.

Second, it's easy to deal with that burden. You can

shift it easily through my client by overproducing. If you don't want to do the work to get through the documents, take out the privilege documents and give us the rest. We'll look through them and find the ones that are responsive. It will shift the burden on us. It will be a document dump so to speak as that phrase is used, but it's relatively modest in size, and we'll speed through it so we can easily help them out if they're going to find to be too burdensome to do what we think the federal rules require them to do.

With respect to the effort that we made to limit the document requests. At the start, I think I already offered it, your Honor. A good faith effort to compromise but while reserving rights is not a waiver of your right to take fuller discovery. And, for example, if someone said the documents that you're seeking are in these 20 file cabinets, and that's a big burden to have to look through them. As a helpful counsel saying, well, why don't you look through those five drawers and see what you got.

And in this case when they look through the five draws they found almost nothing that's responsive on certain topics. And I didn't waive my right to seek the appropriate scope of discovery to get what I need before I take depositions. And now I'm saying, you need to look at the other filing cabinets, whether they're electronic or hard copy. We also know that they're very limited.

I think it's reasonable. It's over the plate. They're potentially responsive. And even if it is a \$100,000 burden in a \$200 million case, some might say that's extremely proportionate.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let me just drill into one of your comments because I'm not sure I know the facts here. I understand that there's some 8,000 documents that were reviewed. Counsel for defendant your comments suggest that you may believe that plaintiff have only produced documents that are documents that were only produced as a result of the ESI protocol. In other words, they may have not looked for paper documents. Is that a concern here?

MR. ROSS: No, your Honor. That has not been the basis for the request that we're talking about. The files may well have been electronic and online, so personally I don't know. Mr. Breland my colleague who's also on may know through his discussions with plaintiffs' counsel what was encompassed by their electronic searches. But our concern has not been, as I understand it, that they didn't look at paper documents, so I don't think that's at play.

THE COURT: Thank you. So counsel with respect to the first request, this is for counsel for defendant, which is request five related to the loan documents. You've described some of the kinds of things that you're looking for through the document production. Can I ask, are you anticipating taking a

deposition from people involved in the negotiation of the contracts? I ask in part to determine whether or not that maybe a more efficient way of finding some of the information related to the process of crafting these documents, as well as the documents themselves as we evaluate the burden associated with the request for paper documents. Counsel for defendant, what's your expectation here.

MR. ROSS: David Ross, your Honor. The answer is, I was not expecting to have to do so, and hoping not to have to do so. The way that K&L Gates dealt with our subpoena was not entirely satisfactory from our perspective, but we had not brought it before your Honor. They delivered responsive documents or potentially responsive documents to plaintiffs' counsel rather than producing them to us as a non-party in possession of relevant information. So my understanding is that they sent 1200 or so documents that they thought were responsive to the plaintiffs' counsel. And as I said, we got less than 10 pieces of paper in total after 1200 documents were sent by counsel.

THE COURT: Thank you. Let me come back to counsel for plaintiff. Counsel, can I hear your response to defendant's offer to accept a document dump. I assume, but correct me if I'm wrong, that in reviewing the 8,000 documents the first time around, your team coded those of the 8,000 documents that you thought were privileged. If that assumption

is incorrect, let me know cause that's my assumption. I understand that the burden associated with doing what Mr. Ross just offered would not be substantial. How do you respond?

MR. HONG: My understanding is that with respect to the coding would not have coded not responsive documents. I think my understanding is that we coded the privilege documents and not the responsive documents. If I am wrong about that, since I did not do the review, my colleague Amber Will can tell me otherwise who is also on the line. But my understanding is that would not have coded not responsive as privileged. I do want to address the burden issue which I think is critical here, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Can we just pause and get an answer to that question if somebody on the line knows it.

MS. WILL: Yes, your Honor. This is Amber Will for plaintiff. And in the review I can confirm that documents were marked for responsiveness first. And if they were marked responsive to the limited request that were agreed upon by the parties, then the documents would then be marked for privileged. So if the document was marked not responsive in the first instance, the privilege review would not have been done. So it would require us to review all of the documents that were originally marked non-responsive for a privilege review the second time.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you. That's helpful. Thank

you very much. I'm sorry, Mr. Hong, please go ahead.

MR. HONG: Mr. Hong again. I think one of the critical issues is the burden, and this is whether it's a reasonable burden or not. And since Mr. Ross uses the baseball analogies, I would say that it's not right over the plate.

It's a wild pitch. And the reason why it's a wild pitch is that — first of all, my estimate is not something that I pulled out of somewhere unknown. It's based on what we did in the original review, how much time it required associates to do the work at the average billing rate they are doing it. And quite frankly, I did not estimate 200 hours to 400 hours. We estimated a little lower than that quite frankly, but we still came up with well over \$100,000 in our billing rate on that.

Whether it is \$100 million, \$200 million or a billion dollars, it's still \$100,000, your Honor. It's still 100,000 plus. It's a substantial sum of money. So if you were to compare millions versus thousands, well, perhaps Mr. Ross can view it that way, but our clients do not necessarily view it that way.

The second point that I wanted to make is about this document dump that your Honor mentioned. We looked at these documents very carefully for responsiveness, and some of them are obviously not responsive, that's why we didn't produce it. Some of them are confidential documents. So it's not that easy for us to say, Oh, we just turn over whatever the non-privilege

documents out of this collection on doing that. It takes further review and further work, which is all arising to the burden that we've been talking about. Given what their scope is and given what the scope was, quite frankly, it is going to cause a great deal of work at this point to do this, to essentially redo this. What the central premise of this whole request as we mentioned in our letter is that the defendants spend a lot of time with us. We work together in trying to come up with more limited but appropriate search terms.

We diligently and in good faith ran these searches and did not come up with that many documents. Mr. Ross thinks that they're documents in document folders somewhere and files that we did not look at or we somehow did something surreptitious about it. We didn't do that. That's what our hits were, and they basically want us to do redo it. Because they're -- for lack of a better word I think, the way I read it is they're suspicious. There's nothing to be suspicious about. We did our job, and those are the hits we had and those are the documents we produced.

I also want to briefly address about the K&L Gates documents. It is true that we produced relatively few documents, but it is because they were related to the mezzanine loans. Again, the responsiveness to the issues at hand is what guided us to look at these documents. We weren't trying to withhold something, again, in an unfair manner. So I guess

what I wanted to just bear in mind is that we have produced in good faith all the documents. We did not anticipate — regardless of whatever Mr. Ross and others say about reserving rights, we did not anticipate coming in April when the documents were produced in January, we did not anticipate coming three months later, basically a month and a half before close of discovery to say — to tell us, the plaintiff, to redo document discovery and cause this substantial burden on us. And that's the unreasonable part of this. That's the wild pitch part of this whole request, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Ross, can I ask you to respond to that, understanding that during your conversation with counsel for plaintiffs you reserved, did not waive rights I've heard you say. Still, you just heard counsel for plaintiff argue in essence that a decision was made about what the scope of discovery should be here and that there's not good justification to permit its expansion at this late stage. How do you respond to that. And most significantly other than just the number; in other words, the scant number of documents that were produced as a result of this approach, what's the reason why the broader scope of discovery requested here is now warranted?

MR. ROSS: David Ross. Let me say three things. One, as to the timing of our making the application to your Honor. This falls into the famous, No good deed goes unpunished

category in the sense that we have been trying to resolve these complaints that we have had with the inadequacy of the production for months. And perhaps it's our failing for having tried to work on it to a point that we thought your Honor would find it after looking at, for example, some of the attachments to the document 90 that we filed. You can see how many back and forth efforts we made to try to reach agreement with plaintiffs' counsel to capture the documents on the subjects that we're trying to get.

So perhaps a failing on our part for trying too hard to reach agreement before coming to you, but that's the reason why we are here now. Point two, it's not that late. Nothing is imminent and it's not a problem. If it's going to take them two weeks, so it takes them two weeks. In the scheme of this case and in the scheme of the issues in this whole context, that's nothing of great importance and there's no prejudice to anybody.

Number three, there should have been responsive documents on some of these topics. And we have from other sources which we pointed out to them responsive documents that they did not produce. Their failure to produce documents that should have been searched for and obtained to us demonstrated that they were not properly performing the searches that needed to be performed. I'm not saying that anybody intentionally hid anything or falsified anything. But in a case with the issues

of importance here, we want to make sure that we have the communications that Cushman and Wakefield had with tenants. I don't think that is so burdensome or difficult to find.

Same thing with --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Can I pause you? Will you be able to keep the thread if I interrupt you?

MR. ROSS: Yes.

THE COURT: Good. Just briefly, can you give me some examples of the kind of things that you received from third parties that you believe plaintiffs should have and that would have been responsive that were not produced to you?

MR. ROSS: I'm going to ask Mr. Breland if he can supply that, your Honor.

MR. BRELAND: This is Andrew Breland speaking for the defendant. Your Honor, before we even began discovery in this case, we were aware of efforts by the plaintiffs through Rexmark Holdings to intervene in negotiations with prospective or existing tenants at Union Station. We heard that from our client, and our client heard that, from among other people, the principal for the plaintiff. We're also aware of documentary evidence, including email between plaintiff and our client where the plaintiff attest that they are taking over negotiations with tenants.

And finally we're aware of at least one marketing document put together by Cushman & Wakefield for lease of

office space at Union Station. None of those documents were produced in plaintiff's January production, but they're relevant and responsive to the request that we made.

THE COURT: Thank you. Did you share that information with counsel for plaintiff to determine whether those came up in the original group of 8,000 or so documents?

MR. BRELAND: Yes, your Honor. This is Andrew Breland for the defendant. We specifically showed them the email or one email between our client and plaintiffs principal that is the relevant to the tenant interference issue. And the response that we got -- and I'm not sure if it's reflected in the attachment or if it's in one of the letters down the email chain that was attachment D to our joint letter -- was that the document wasn't responsive to the initially agreed upon narrowed requests. We went back and forth on that issue, and ultimately that's what gets us here is that they had a narrower interpretation of our request than we did apparently.

THE COURT: Thank you. That's very helpful. I apologize for the interruption, Mr. Ross, if you'd like to pick up where you were.

MR. ROSS: Your Honor, we're close to an hour. I think you understand our points. I think given the importance, the size of the case, the significance of this discovery, to our affirmative defenses and to plaintiffs' fundamental arguments about what the contract says and means, these

additional requests or the original requests and having them responded to is appropriate, is reasonable, is proportional, and we respectfully request that your Honor order them.

THE COURT: Very good. Understood. Counsel, what I'm going to do is this. I unfortunately have some things that I need to do. Go ahead, Mr. Hong.

MR. HONG: Your Honor, this is Mr. Hong. I would be remiss if I didn't have Amber Will address the point that Mr. Breland said for a minute or so if you may just indulge so you have both sides of the story so to speak.

THE COURT: Yes, thank you. I'm happy to hear from her.

MS. WILL: Thank you, your Honor. This is Amber Will for plaintiff, and I'll keep it brief. I just want to note that we did get an email from USSM regarding an email that they believe should have been in the production. We identified by email back to them that the email actually is not responsive under the narrow document request that the parties had agreed to back in December. I agree with Mr. Breland that this is properly why they expanded their request to have that "concerning" language rather than it be "with" language that they started with and the parties had agreed to back in December. But the document that they produced to us as evidence that we did not engage thoroughly in our discovery obligations was not actually responsive under the request that

the parties had agreed upon.

THE COURT: Thank you. And counsel for defendant, let me hear from you about that. I appreciate this may be the genesis of the concerning formulation here. Can I hear your response to that argument by counsel is — in other words, were plaintiffs in your view improperly construing in too narrow a fashion your initial request; or were they construing your initial request properly understanding that as formulated they were more narrow than the requests that are being presented to the Court now. It's pertinent to me as I'm thinking about what the scope, if any, additional discovery I should permit here. Counsel, can you just respond.

MR. ROSS: Go ahead, Andrew.

MR. BRELAND: Yes, your Honor. This is Andrew Breland for defendant. The initial request that we've served back in September of last year was documents and communications reflecting efforts to communicate with prospective or existing tenants. The email that we're talking about is absolutely responsive to that initial request. As to the negotiated initial request where we, as Mr. Ross said, reserved all rights, we limited it to communications "with" tenants.

Now if the there had been any responsive documents in the production to that issue which we raised both with the Court and plaintiffs' counsel several times, we may not have had an issue with it. The problem is, there were no responsive

documents. So we engaged in the meet and confer process and then tried to come up with a discovery request that would meet the needs of the case while being narrower than the original request that we served in September, and plaintiffs have not sort of been willing to do anything beyond the initial request that we got in December, but that were just that initial narrowed request.

of the initial request. We're talking about request 12. Is it defendant's position that the document that you flagged and that we've been discussing is a document or communication reflecting efforts to communicate with and meet with existing tenants at Union Station, such that would fall within the scope of that initial request as drafted.

MR. BRELAND: Andrew Breland for defendant, your Honor. Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you. Good. Understood. That's helpful. So again, I apologize, counsel. What I'm going to do is this. I'm going to schedule a brief conference, hopefully brief conference on Monday. I need to do something now and I can't keep my court reporter here what I'll call after hours on a Friday, especially Good Friday. So I'm going to just take a break now. I will schedule a conference on Monday morning where I'll tell you what I think about this dispute and thank you all for your time here today. I apologize that I can't

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1	take the time right now to deliver a decision, but I will get
2	you one early on Monday. Thank you all very much, counsel.
3	Have a good holiday weekend.
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